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ABSTRACT. As climate change and globalization are opening the Arctic to human activities, the debate about how best to 
organize Arctic institutions in order to facilitate regional governance has been invigorated. One of the most controversial 
ideas in this debate has been the notion that a comprehensive treaty should govern the Arctic. Depending on its exact design, 
such a treaty could radically transform regional decision-making procedures and substantial issue areas. It has been opposed 
by several regional stakeholders, including most regional states. This article examines how specific factors determine the 
prominence of the idea of an Arctic treaty in governance debates, and whether it is likely to become a crucial feature in 
future discussions. It argues that there are multiple ideas concerning the content and purpose of an Arctic treaty. Some of 
its proponents favor radical transformation of the regional order, while others envision more moderate reforms of existing 
institutions. It maps how the Arctic treaty debate has developed in four phases from 1970 until today, showing that it has been 
driven by a combination of functional gaps in the regional institutional setup, changing public political discourses about Arctic 
governance, and the degree of opposition among regional stakeholders. As some of these factors persist, the Arctic treaty will 
most likely continue to play a role in regional governance debates. In case of a regional crisis, it can once again become a focal 
point for discussion.
Key words: Arctic; governance; Arctic Treaty; Arctic Council; Ilulissat Declaration; European Parliament; NGO; Polar Code; 
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RÉSUMÉ. À mesure que le changement climatique et la mondialisation permettent à l’être humain d’exercer des activités dans 
l’Arctique, le débat entourant la meilleure façon d’organiser les institutions de l’Arctique dans le but de faciliter la gouvernance 
régionale a repris de l’ampleur. Dans le cadre de ce débat, l’une des idées portant le plus à controverse a trait à la notion 
que l’Arctique devrait être gouverné par un traité détaillé. Selon sa formulation exacte, ce traité pourrait avoir pour effet de 
transformer de manière radicale les procédures de prise de décisions à l’échelle régionale et les enjeux importants. Plusieurs 
intervenants régionaux s’opposent à ce type de traité, dont la plupart des États de la région. Cet article porte sur la manière 
dont des facteurs particuliers déterminent l’importance de l’idée d’un traité de l’Arctique dans les débats sur la gouvernance 
et tâche d’établir si cette idée risque de devenir un aspect fondamental des discussions futures. L’article soutient qu’il existe de 
nombreuses idées à propos du contenu et de la raison d’être d’un traité de l’Arctique. Certains de ses promoteurs favorisent une 
transformation radicale de l’ordre régional, tandis que d’autres préconisent une réforme plus modérée des institutions actuelles. 
L’article illustre la manière dont le débat sur le traité de l’Arctique a traversé quatre phases, de 1970 à présent, et montre qu’il 
répond à un ensemble d’écarts fonctionnels sur le plan de la configuration institutionnelle régionale, des discours politiques 
publics changeants sur la gouvernance de l’Arctique et du degré d’opposition des intervenants régionaux. Puisque certains 
de ces facteurs persistent, le traité de l’Arctique continuera vraisemblablement de jouer un rôle dans les débats régionaux en 
matière de gouvernance. En présence de crise régionale, il pourra, encore une fois, devenir un point de discussion central.
Mots clés : Arctique; gouvernance; traité de l’Arctique; Conseil de l’Arctique; déclaration d’Ilulissat; Parlement européen; 
ONG; Code polaire; institutions
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INTRODUCTION
International interest in Arctic governance (the governing 
that occurs internationally through cooperation between 
several Arctic states and entities without one sovereign 
authority in charge [Finkelstein, 1995:369]) has increased 
significantly over the past decade. Climate change and 
globalization are opening the Arctic to human activities, 
including shipping, mining, fisheries, tourism, and oil and 
gas extraction. More activity leads to new challenges for 
Arctic societies and an enhanced need for international 
institutions addressing these challenges. International 
institutions are sets “of rules that stipulate the way in which 
states cooperate with one another,” and they thus include 
both formal forums and organizations, international 
conventions and regulation, and informal norms and 
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agreements (Mearsheimer, 1994/95:8; Simmons and 
Martin, 2002). The new challenges have thus led to a 
continuous debate between policymakers and academics 
about how best to organize Arctic institutions in order to 
facilitate regional governance. 
One of the most controversial ideas in this debate has 
been the notion that a comprehensive treaty should govern 
the Arctic, often in a version similar to the Antarctic 
Treaty system. Depending on its exact design, such a 
treaty could have wide-ranging consequences for both 
regional decision-making procedures and substantial 
issue areas. Some proposed versions of an Arctic treaty 
would diminish the influence currently held by regional 
states and by organizations representing Indigenous and 
local communities, while banning or limiting several 
activities, including the exploitation of natural resources. 
Between 2007 and 2013, academics and political actors, 
such as Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and 
several non-governmental organizations (NGOs), pushed 
such ideas. Many regional stakeholders who benefit from 
the current setup, most importantly the majority of the 
Arctic states, have gone out of their way to oppose such 
fundamental reforms, arguing that an Arctic treaty would 
be a redundant distraction, which would take up diplomatic 
energy that could be used for other, more concrete 
initiatives. In the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, a document in 
which some of the principles of current Arctic governance 
were reaffirmed, the five coastal states (Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States) 
explicitly emphasized that they saw “no need to develop a 
new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the 
Arctic Ocean” (Arctic Ocean Conference, 2008:1) 
This article examines how specific factors determine the 
prominence of the idea of an Arctic treaty in governance 
debates (focusing specifically on the period from 1970 to 
2017), and whether it is likely to become a crucial feature 
in future discussions. The article is based on analysis of 
original documents, reports, and the existing academic 
literature, as well as 12 semi-structured interviews with 
politicians, civil servants, NGO representatives, and 
experts. The interviews were conducted in person or 
over the phone in 2016, 2017, and 2018 and included both 
proponents and opponents of an Arctic Treaty. Some of the 
interviews were used for other research projects as well. 
As some of the interviewees are still involved in Arctic 
governance, they were promised anonymity in order to 
ensure that they could express themselves candidly. 
The article progresses in five steps. The first section 
defines the Arctic treaty and provides an analytical 
framework for analyzing its prominence in regional 
governance debates. The following four sections present 
the history of the idea of an Arctic treaty in four phases: 
1970 – 96, 1996 – 2007, 2007 – 13, and 2013 – 17. 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This first section defines the Arctic treaty by setting it 
apart from the current regional order and outlines how to 
analyze the coherence of the movement behind it and the 
causes that determine its momentum in the governance 
debate. I understand order to be the totality of relationships 
and principles as defined by the most powerful actors in 
the region. Following Koivurova (2015), an Arctic treaty 
can be defined as an overarching, legally binding treaty 
that applies only to the Arctic and covers several regional 
policy areas and at least a substantial geographical part 
of the region. Existing legal arrangements do not satisfy 
this definition. The UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS; IUCN, 1982), to name one example, also 
applies to other regions, while specific Arctic arrangements, 
such as the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar 
Bears (IUCN/SSC PBSG, 1973) or the recent agreements 
negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council, only 
address one specific issue (Koivurova, 2015). 
Oran Young argues that the Arctic order consists of 
a variety of multilateral and bilateral agreements and 
relationships that is moving towards becoming a regime 
complex, that is, “a set of elemental regimes or elements 
that pertain to the same issue domain or spatially defined 
area, that are related to each other in a non-hierarchical 
manner, and that interact with one another in the sense that 
the operation of each affects the performance of others” 
(Young, 2012:394, 2016b). Such orders can be categorized 
on a continuum between two ideal types: complete 
integration to complete fragmentation. In a completely 
integrated order, all issues within a geographical space 
or a set of related issues are connected through one well-
defined arrangement. In a completely fragmented order, 
issues are handled by specific institutions in complete 
isolation from one another (Young, 2011). The Arctic order 
is located between these extremes. Most issue domains 
are covered by specific institutions and regulation, such as 
the IMO Polar Code that regulates shipping (IMO, 2015) 
or the aforementioned Agreement on the Conservation of 
Polar Bears. While no overarching arrangement exists for 
the entire region, several global and regional arrangements 
facilitate cooperation across issue domains. Of these, 
UNCLOS and the Arctic Council warrant special attention 
in order to understand the debates about an Arctic treaty (cf. 
Molenaar, 2014:79 – 80). Even though only seven of the eight 
Arctic states are parties to UNCLOS (the United States has 
not signed UNCLOS), the convention still functions as a 
framework for maritime governance, as the United States 
recognizes most of it as customary law. UNCLOS provides 
a legal foundation for specific maritime issue areas that 
are then regulated by more specific arrangements (Young, 
2011:327 – 328, 2012:396). 
Similarly, the Arctic Council provides solutions within 
specific issue domains, while also facilitating governance 
across issue areas (Molenaar, 2014). While the Council’s 
working groups, task forces, and expert groups address 
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specific issues, the biennial ministerial and biannual Senior 
Arctic Official meetings allow the states and Permanent 
Participants to discuss cross-sectoral issues and to establish 
new working groups, task forces, and expert groups. The 
two-year chairmanship permits states to push specific 
agendas, including cross-sectoral governance.  
The Arctic treaty is not a uniform category. In the 
following, I show how Arctic treaty proposals can be 
categorized based on two ideal types: radical and moderate 
proposals. These terms are not meant to have normative 
connotations. Instead, I follow the Oxford English 
Dictionary, which defines them based on how extensive are 
the changes they envision for the existing regional order. 
Radical proposals want to break with the fundamental 
principles of the existing order and suggest that extensive 
new institutions must be established. By contrast, moderate 
proposals focus on incremental reform of existing 
institutions and principles. Of course, some proposals only 
recommend that some existing principles be disregarded, 
and they therefore fall in between these ideal types.
The regional order has undergone significant changes 
over the period, which must be taken into account when 
categorizing proposals as moderate or radical. Institutions 
have come into being through political compromises 
between regional stakeholders, and over time the regional 
order has become more dense and complex. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, the regional order consisted of a few agreements 
and arrangements that covered specific issue areas. As there 
were few regional institutions, it is difficult to categorize 
Arctic treaty proposals in this period as radical or moderate. 
Several new institutions, most importantly the Arctic 
Council, were created around the end of the Cold War 
and in the decade that followed, solidifying a specific 
regional order (Young, 2005). From then on, it becomes 
possible to categorize Arctic treaty proposals as radical or 
moderate using as indicators four key principles that had 
come into being by the mid-1990s. These principles can be 
derived from the Ottawa Declaration (AC, 1996) and from 
subsequent Arctic Council declarations and other regional 
governance initiatives that have reaffirmed them as pillars 
of regional governance. First, moderate proposals accept 
UNCLOS and the Arctic Council as overarching regional 
institutions, and they find a role for these institutions within 
the Arctic treaty. Second, the 1996 Ottawa Declaration that 
created the Arctic Council solidified the position of Arctic 
states and Indigenous peoples as regional stakeholders by 
making the former group Members and the latter Permanent 
Participants in the Council. As Council Members, the 
states have decision-making power and a de facto veto over 
decisions. While Indigenous peoples do not have formal 
veto power as Permanent Participants, they still have 
significant informal influence as vocal protests from these 
organizations could challenge the legitimacy of regional 
decisions and organizations. States and other actors are 
therefore often (but not always) careful to ensure that 
Indigenous peoples are heard in regional decision-making. 
Moderate proposals acknowledge these stakeholders’ right 
to make regional decisions. Third, the dual principles of 
sustainable development and environmental protection 
were also written into the Ottawa Declaration. Moderate 
proposals accept that local and Indigenous communities 
and states have a right to industrial development and 
resource extraction in the region, as long as it does not lead 
to significant environmental degradation. Consequently, 
they do not seek to ban these activities or turn the Arctic 
into a nature reserve. Finally, the Ottawa Declaration (AC, 
1996: footnote 1) specified that the Arctic Council “should 
not deal with matters related to military security,” and 
such issues have since then remained outside the purview 
of regional forums and organizations. Moderate proposals 
maintain that dividing line between military security issues 
and other issues. 
The success of Arctic treaty proposals depends on three 
factors: functional gaps in the institutional setup, changes 
in public political discourses, and opposition and support 
from regional stakeholders. First, functional gaps in the 
Arctic order emerge when institutions are unable to provide 
effective solutions to regional challenges. Analyzing 
functional gaps entails answering three questions. What 
type of challenges is the Arctic order facing? Why and to 
what extent are current institutions incapable of handling 
these challenges? And how would an Arctic treaty 
improve the ability of regional institutions to address these 
challenges? Arctic treaty proponents argue that the Arctic 
order faces large functional gaps that an overarching 
treaty can best address, while their opponents claim that a 
less integrated order (such as the status quo) will be more 
efficient, contending that a more modest approach is more 
achievable, flexible, and adaptable. It is easier for states to 
agree on the creation of a specific institution for a specific 
issue or sector than to create comprehensive arrangements 
for an entire region. Furthermore, regime complexes 
allow the creation of arrangements that are tailored to 
specific issues and sectors, which allows them to address 
new challenges and political conditions. While change 
in one sector within a completely integrated order could 
necessitate costly renegotiation of the entire order, in a 
regime complex such change can be kept within the specific 
sector (Keohane and Victor, 2010:16 – 19). An Arctic treaty, 
its opponents argue, would be too difficult to negotiate, and 
it would be unnecessary, as the existing order has managed 
to adapt to the new challenges and conditions facing the 
region (Young, 2011, 2012).
Arctic treaty proposals focus on addressing functional 
gaps when they identify palpable governance gaps in the 
order as well as describe the content of the envisioned 
treaty and how it would facilitate effective solutions to 
these issues compared to the alternatives. By contrast, 
proposals that do not focus on addressing functional gaps 
merely point to limitations in the current setup (and in some 
cases even this diagnosis misunderstands the challenges 
facing the region) and jump to the conclusion that a treaty is 
needed without outlining its content and explaining how it 
would improve regional governance. 
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Second, changes in public political discourses can 
also strengthen or weaken a cause significantly. Public 
political discourses are shared ways of debating and 
understanding common goals and strategies for achieving 
those goals. While public political discourses can reflect 
actual circumstances, such as the existence of functional 
gaps, they also have their own dynamics that work 
independently of realities. These dynamics can come to 
influence the susceptibility of different political causes 
(Joachim, 2003; Shenhav, 2006). Certain events can 
trigger changes in existing discourses that create windows 
of opportunity for specific causes, especially if an issue 
can be framed as a security threat. Political actors can 
actively attempt to shape public political discourses as 
part of their political strategies by seeking to highlight 
security threats that make their cause more attractive 
(Buzan et al., 1998). Events and framing by political actors 
can pressure existing stakeholders to give them enhanced 
influence or create coalitions by convincing other actors 
to join their cause (Joachim, 2003). As the analysis below 
demonstrates, before 2007, proponents of Arctic reform 
mainly highlighted environmental, economic, social, and 
political threats facing the region. Following the Russian 
flag-planting in 2007, these public political discourses 
began to portray the region as facing national security 
threats with potential implications for global peace, which 
in turn caught the attention of media and political actors 
outside of the Arctic and fertilized the ground for calls for 
more radical reforms of regional governance structures. 
Finally, opposition or support by regional stakeholders 
may also influence how Arctic treaty proposals fare. 
The regional states sit at the apex of the current regional 
order, and they have historically been the main opponents 
of an Arctic treaty, which many of them believe would 
diminish the effectiveness of regional institutions. Of 
course, the Arctic states do not share the same interests, 
and their attitudes to the Arctic treaty differ at certain 
points in time, depending on their priorities. The Arctic 
states maintain their position within the regional order by 
combining reforms to enhance institutional legitimacy with 
initiatives that increase the cost of challenging the status 
quo. Legitimate institutions provide effective solutions 
to regional problems (output legitimacy), while giving 
relevant actors a chance to influence decision-making 
(input legitimacy). By making regional institutions more 
legitimate, the Arctic states diminish the incentive of actors 
to contest the existing order. They can simultaneously deter 
potential contestation by demonstrating that they will form 
a united front against them, thus showing that changing the 
regional order will be costly, if not impossible (Rahbek-
Clemmensen and Thomasen, 2018). 
The organizations representing Indigenous communities 
have been potential partners for both proponents and 
opponents of an Arctic treaty. Like the Arctic states, they 
have an interest in maintaining the overall status quo that 
gives them a privileged position compared to other actors, 
such as non-regional actors. They have therefore at times 
been skeptical of giving non-regional actors influence 
in institutions that could undermine their own position 
(Graczyk and Koivurova, 2014; Willis and Depledge, 2015). 
However, at the same time, they have less influence than the 
Arctic states (Olsen and Shadian, 2016) and can therefore 
potentially ally with actors that want to upset the status quo, 
insofar as it will enhance their regional position. 
In the following sections, I show that radical and 
moderate proposals depend on different factors. Radical 
proposals typically do not provide coherent solutions that 
address functional gaps in the Arctic order, and they contest 
the position of regional stakeholders, such as the regional 
states and Indigenous and local communities. They therefore 
become salient when public political discourses become 
detached from the challenges facing the region. Moderate 
proposals, by contrast, more often address the functional 
gaps facing the regional order and envision changes that do 
not necessarily contest the position of Arctic stakeholders. 
They are therefore less dependent on specific public political 
discourses, as they can aim to convince expert audiences 
representing regional stakeholders. 
The history of the Arctic treaty proposals can roughly 
be divided into four phases based on the functional gaps 
they aimed to address and the dominant public political 
discourses. In the first phase from the early 1970s to the 
mid-1990s, the Arctic treaty was part of a mainly academic 
debate about whether an overarching regional forum (what 
eventually became the Arctic Council) should be founded. 
In the second phase from 1996 to 2007, the Arctic treaty 
continued to be debated in expert circles, now as a possible 
solution to the functional gaps that still existed after the 
creation of the Arctic Council. In the third phase from 2007 
to around 2013, new public political discourses paved the way 
for wider interest in the idea of an Arctic treaty. In the final 
phase after 2013, public interest in an Arctic treaty dampened 
significantly and proposals only appeared occasionally. 
1970 – 96: ACADEMIC DEBATES ABOUT THE
CREATION OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL
The idea of an Arctic treaty emerged within academia 
in the 1970s and 1980s as part of a debate about whether 
region-wide institutions should be developed; a debate that 
continued until the Arctic Council was created in 1996 
(AC, 1996). These proposals were pushed by academics and 
targeted at an expert audience. They had limited political 
impact, as they were too ambitious for the Arctic states who 
struggled just to establish the less comprehensive Arctic 
Council. These Arctic treaty proposals cannot be said to be 
radical or moderate, as there were very few institutions and 
principles with which they could break.  
The first coherent proposal for an Arctic treaty was 
Maxwell Cohen’s suggestion to create an Arctic Basin 
treaty among the states surrounding the Arctic Ocean 
(Cohen, 1971). Cohen, a Canadian professor of law, 
responded to a set of legal and political challenges facing 
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Canada in the Arctic, which he believed were indicative of 
a larger regional problem that necessitated new multilateral 
institution-building and a reform of international law. 
Cohen argued that Canadian sovereignty over its part of 
the Arctic was tenuous and contested, in part because the 
existing law of the sea did not provide a common standard 
for limiting the breadth of the territorial sea in which states 
could exert their authority. The third UN Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, where these issues were settled as UNCLOS 
was finalized in 1982, only commenced two years later. 
Furthermore, the law of the sea did not sufficiently address 
the status of ice-covered waters and the polar ice cap. New 
commercial and political developments, such as discoveries 
of possible mineral and petroleum deposits in the Canadian 
Arctic, increased environmental awareness and concern for 
living resources, which pressed Ottawa to address these 
issues by expanding Canadian jurisdiction in the Arctic. 
This, of course, caused criticism from other regional 
states. Cohen saw these issues as a symptom of a larger 
institutional failure, as the law of the sea did not provide the 
adequate mechanisms for any state to handle issues related 
to economic development, environmental protection, 
scientific activities, and the conditions of Indigenous 
peoples. The solution, he argued, was to create “a body of 
Arctic basin and international opinion through conferences, 
in the private and public sectors, that will help bring about 
an Arctic basin consensus, perhaps an Arctic basin treaty, 
and all ultimately lead to a new law of the sea conference” 
(Cohen, 1971:79). The Arctic Basin treaty was thus but an 
intermediate step toward the ultimate goal: a reformed law 
of the sea that addressed the specific issues facing Canada 
and the other Arctic littoral states. 
Although motivated by the functional gaps in the 
Arctic, Cohen’s proposal was not only about the Arctic; it 
was a response to gaps in international law in general at the 
time. His goal was not to create an Arctic treaty proposal 
that could solve regional challenges, but rather to create 
a platform that could facilitate fundamental reform of 
international law. Consequently, he did not provide details 
about the content of his envisioned Arctic Basin treaty 
or indeed the new intergovernmental body (which can be 
considered a prototype of the Arctic Council), and there 
was therefore no discussion of whether alternative, less 
comprehensive arrangements could address the challenges 
facing the region. 
The idea of an Arctic treaty was not raised again until 
the late 1980s. The Arctic had undergone significant 
change since 1971. The current version of UNCLOS 
was completed in 1982 and it settled several of the issues 
that had marred the existing law of the sea, including 
a framework for settling maritime boundaries and an 
article (234) authorizing coastal states to create special 
regulation for ice-covered waters (IUCN, 1982). In spite 
of these improvements, several legal issues were left open. 
As mentioned in the previous section, UNCLOS did not 
provide specific regulation for a host of Arctic issues. 
Furthermore, the United States had not signed UNCLOS. 
Agreements regarding specific issue areas had begun to 
appear around the time Cohen’s piece had been published 
(the first was the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar 
Bears in 1973) and several other sectoral institutions had 
been proposed, including for military and environmental 
issues (Griffiths, 1979; Keskitalo, 2004:45; English, 
2013:122).  
The Arctic was also undergoing significant political 
and institutional shifts that paved the way for debate on an 
Arctic treaty. The de-escalation of the Cold War and the 
general increase in environmental awareness following 
the Chernobyl and Bhopal disasters increased interest in 
the Arctic environment (Keskitalo, 2004:36 – 39; Nord, 
2015:12 – 14). In 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev held his famous 
Murmansk speech in which he called for enhanced 
cooperation in general and strengthened control of military 
activities, including a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the 
Arctic (Gorbachev, 1987; Purver, 1989; Åtland, 2008). 
Shortly after, a group of academics proposed the idea of 
an Arctic Council at a conference in Tromsø, Norway 
(Pharand, 1992:166 – 167). 
The Murmansk speech also led to several government 
initiatives. Finland proposed an environmental dialog 
among the eight Arctic states with an inaugural meeting 
held in Rovaniemi, Finland in September 1989 (Young, 
1998:58; English, 2013:105 – 140). As part of this process, 
the countries mapped the existing institutions and 
declarations and discussed how regional governance could 
be strengthened. At the Rovaniemi meeting, the possibility 
of creating a regional treaty that could cover environmental 
and economic development issues was briefly discussed, 
although no thorough proposal was made. While Finland 
and Canada were especially positive, other nations were 
more skeptical. In the end, the process focused on the 
narrower goal of creating a structure for cooperation on 
environmental issues, which would become the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991 and 
was later subsumed under the Arctic Council (Government 
of Canada et al., 1989; Tennberg, 2000:16 – 20; Keskitalo, 
2004:55).
Shortly after the Rovaniemi meeting, Canada began to 
push for the creation of an Arctic Council, which sparked 
several government and think tank policy reports and 
working groups (English, 2013:125 – 26, 141 – 251). Donat 
Pharand, a Canadian law professor who had taken part in 
the Tromsø conference, was involved in this work. Inspired 
by Cohen, he became interested in developing an Arctic 
treaty (Pharand, 1992:166 – 67; Lalonde and MacDonald, 
2007; Bartenstein, 2015:55). Compared to Cohen’s proposal, 
Pharand’s proposal was much more tangible and offered a 
commented draft treaty. Furthermore, while Cohen’s treaty 
had focused on the Arctic Basin (and implicitly concerned 
the five coastal states only), Pharand’s (1992) proposal 
would include Finland, Iceland, and Sweden. 
Pharand also offered different justifications for why 
these schemes were needed. While Cohen had seen a 
regional council and treaty as a step toward reforming 
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the law of the sea as such, Pharand did not consider 
international law to be flawed per se. Instead, he argued 
that new environmental, political, and social challenges 
necessitated enhanced international cooperation (Pharand, 
1992:169 – 183). Furthermore, though military security was 
not an imminent threat for Pharand, he believed that the 
end of the Cold War had created a window of opportunity 
that the regional states should use to demilitarize the 
Arctic, making it a “[z]one of peace or a nuclear-free-
zone” (Pharand, 1992:183). He also argued that some of 
the new elements in UNCLOS (articles 122 and 123) might 
instill on the states an obligation to cooperate, which they 
could discharge through an Arctic Council (Pharand, 
1992:187 – 190). His proposal thus demonstrated that the 
reformed UNCLOS had closed the most perilous legal gaps 
of the old law of the sea and created new obligations. 
Pharand viewed the Arctic Council as necessary for the 
states to cooperate, while the Arctic treaty would provide 
the legal foundation for the Council. His ideal council was 
more muscular than the institution that was created in 
1996: it would be able to address military matters (which 
is prohibited by the Ottawa Declaration), give membership 
and more influence to Indigenous peoples’ organizations, 
NGOs, territorial governments, and non-Arctic states 
(the Ottawa Declaration made the Indigenous peoples’ 
organizations Permanent Participants, while NGOs and 
non-Arctic states are Observers only), and include a 
permanent secretariat with stable funding (the Arctic 
Council did not get a permanent secretariat until 2011). 
Basing the Council on a treaty meant that the commitments 
made by states would be legally binding. At worst, 
failure to honor commitments could be brought before 
the International Court of Justice, as specified in article 
33 of the UN Charter (Pharand, 1992; Bartenstein, 2015; 
Charron, 2015). Unlike Cohen’s ideas, Pharand’s treaty 
was thus part of an ongoing debate about the creation of 
an overarching institution in the region and his treaty was 
meant to support that institution. 
Even though the decade that followed Gorbachev’s 
Murmansk speech was an era of change within Arctic 
governance, the time was not ripe for Pharand’s detailed 
Arctic treaty program, which largely remained an academic 
exercise with little political momentum. Agreeing to a less 
ambitious Arctic Council was already a tall order for the 
regional states and the Indigenous peoples’ organizations; 
Pharand’s more extensive proposal was a step too far. The 
main thrust for the Arctic Council came from Canada, 
which had to create a compromise between the Arctic 
states (especially the United States) and the Indigenous 
peoples’ organizations (mainly the Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference [ICC]) in order to achieve a result. On the one 
hand, Washington feared that the Arctic Council would 
be a vessel for an overly environmentalist preservation 
agenda inhibiting economic activities, that it would 
limit its ability to use the Arctic for military purposes, 
that the list of Arctic issues was too short to warrant the 
establishment of a cross-sectoral Council that would only 
undermine existing institutions, and that the Council 
would give too much influence to Indigenous groups 
(English, 2013:171 – 712, 187 – 193). On the other hand, the 
ICC envisioned an Arctic Council that was much closer 
to Pharand’s vision: a strong regional council covering a 
broad portfolio of issue areas (including military security) 
with emphasis on environmental preservation and with the 
Indigenous peoples as Members. The ICC (1992) favored 
the creation of national and international legal regimes 
and treaties for specific sectors and issues (such as nuclear 
pollution, oil spills, and nuclear weapons) as well as general 
cross-sectoral governance through a strong Arctic Council. 
However, a cross-sectoral Arctic treaty was not a policy 
priority for the Inuit, who struggled just to get permanent 
representation in the Council (ICC, 1992; Shadian, 
2014:106 – 122). As the states met to establish the Arctic 
Council in Ottawa in 1996, the notion of an Arctic treaty 
was not on the mind of many policymakers. 
1996 – 2007: EXPERT DEBATES AFTER THE
CREATION OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL
The creation of the Arctic Council in 1996 did not 
eliminate the Arctic treaty debate. In the following decade, 
the idea of an Arctic treaty was debated within academic 
circles, and some political actors began considering it as a 
viable option for regional governance (for an overview of 
this debate see Koivurova, 2008). As significant regional 
institutions had appeared, it is possible to categorize these 
proposals as either radical or moderate. 
Several changes occurred within regional governance. 
The regional states begun the process of delimiting the 
continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean. Under UNCLOS, the 
coastal states would have 10 years from ratification to claim 
the right to harvest certain resources on the continental 
shelf. Norway ratified UNCLOS in 1996, Russia in 1997, 
Canada in 2003, and Denmark in 2004 (as noted previously, 
the United States has yet to sign the convention). The 
coastal states therefore began to make their claims in the 
first decade of the new millennium, adhering to the process 
established by UNCLOS (Byers, 2013:92 – 127). 
Furthermore, critics argued that the Arctic Council 
lacked the necessary tools to truly handle the challenges 
facing the region (Nord, 2015:25 – 31). As mentioned above, 
without a founding treaty, commitments made by the states 
in the Council would not be legally binding. Furthermore, 
the Council did not have a permanent secretariat or stable 
funding. Indeed, it did not produce many concrete initiatives 
in the first decade of its existence. What it did produce, 
however, was several large analyses on the impact of 
climate change (Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, 2004) 
and human development (Arctic Council, 2004) that helped 
place polar issues on the international agenda. Especially 
the former helped direct international attention to the 
changes occurring in the Arctic, as it illustrated that climate 
change had more severe consequences in that region with 
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temperatures increasing twice as fast as global temperatures 
(Koivurova and Vanderzwaag, 2007). Paradoxically, as 
Koivurova (2008:22) has noted, the Council’s work thus 
illustrated its weaknesses, as the increased attention to 
the challenges wrought by climate change also made the 
impotence of the Council more obvious. 
The imminent environmental, economic, social, and 
political implications of climate change and the impotence 
of regional institutions spurred academics to suggest 
regional reform, including both radical and moderate 
proposals for an Arctic treaty. The ideas of Barry Hart 
Dubner, an American law professor, exemplify the radical 
approach. Dubner (2005) highlighted that climate change 
and pollution paved the way for new environmental, social, 
and political challenges, which the regional order was 
not equipped to handle. Regional resource exploitation, 
including on the continental shelf, would exacerbate 
these problems. The environmental crisis was so severe, 
he argued, that economic activities with environmental 
impact would be illegitimate, as would institutions that 
furthered such activities, such as the Arctic Council 
(Dubner, 2005). The delimitation of the continental 
shelf was also problematic, because “if mining occurs 
on the continental shelf, the contaminants may seep into 
the Arctic food chain” (Dubner, 2005:2). Consequently, 
Dubner envisioned a radical solution to these problems: 
through an Arctic treaty, the Arctic should be turned into 
an international environmental reserve, where only limited 
activities related to science and tourism were allowed, and 
where the Arctic coastal states were banned from claiming 
and exploiting resources on the continental shelf (Dubner, 
2005:11). Whether the regional stakeholders would accept 
such a setup was considered irrelevant. Instead, he believed 
that the international community could create a new Arctic 
order by fiat, overruling the protests and wishes of the 
Arctic states and Indigenous peoples. As he put it, “the 
impending question is whether the international community 
will allow the Arctic to be spoiled by various mining 
activities and oil and gas extraction” (Dubner, 2005:1). 
Dubner’s proposal failed to provide tangible connections 
between challenges and solutions. Although he found 
climate change to be the main threat facing the Arctic, he 
overlooked the fact that the bulk of global emissions are 
produced outside of the Arctic and that his proposals would 
therefore not address the root cause of climate change. He 
also refrained from considering that existing institutions 
could provide solutions to some of the challenges facing the 
region, and he did not discuss how an Arctic treaty would 
improve regional governance compared to these institutions. 
Several moderate proposals were also developed 
during this period. One proposal by Linda Nowlan (2001) 
exemplifies this approach. Like Dubner, Nowlan viewed 
climate change and pollution as threats that necessitated 
regional reform in the form of an Arctic treaty. However, 
her envisioned treaty was much more moderate than 
Dubner’s, and she emphasized that “the intent is not 
to make the Arctic a nature reserve but to allow for 
sustainable use and development” (Nowlan, 2001:58). 
Pursuing a more radical approach would be problematic 
because it would undermine the right of the states and local 
and Indigenous communities of the Arctic to determine the 
balance between environmental protection and economic 
development (Nowlan, 2001:50, 63). Furthermore, it should 
not discard existing regional institutions, such as the Arctic 
Council, but rather “incorporate the innovations that have 
been adopted to date” and strengthen them by giving them 
a legal foundation (Nowlan, 2001:62). The Arctic Council 
should continue to be the main regional institution, yet 
the Arctic treaty would strengthen the Council by giving 
it legal tools, such as dispute settlement procedures and 
clear jurisdictional boundaries vis-à-vis other institutions 
(echoing Pharand’s [1992] arguments from the decade 
prior), and providing it with a steady income stream and a 
permanent secretariat. 
Unlike Dubner, Nowlan acknowledged that the existing 
order had significant advantages over an Arctic treaty. 
An Arctic treaty would not necessarily add much to 
regional governance, as many of the policy areas it would 
address were already covered by existing programs. A 
legally binding treaty could also be less effective if it was 
poorly designed or contained significant legal loopholes 
(Nowlan, 2001:58 – 60). Furthermore, Nowlan took into 
account the need for convincing the Arctic states and other 
stakeholders. A treaty, she argued, would be cumbersome 
to achieve, and it would be difficult to convince the states 
to invest time and energy in this endeavor. However, 
having weighed the advantages and disadvantages, Nowlan 
(2001:58) still concluded that “the arguments favouring a 
new legally binding treaty are convincing, considering the 
value of the Arctic, the serious nature of the environmental 
threats, and the lack of a comprehensive framework in 
which to address these threats.” 
These ideas appeared not only in the academic 
community. The idea of an Arctic treaty was picked up by 
political actors at the margins of Arctic decision-making 
(NGOs, international organizations, and MEPs), who began 
to explore whether there was a need for a new regional order 
(Koivurova, 2008, 2015). Nowlan’s (2001) analysis, to name 
one example, was published by the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), an international network of 
government and civil society organizations. Similarly, the 
Arctic parliamentarians, an informal collaboration between 
Members of Parliament from the eight Arctic states and the 
European Parliament (EP), solicited academic input about 
Arctic governance and debated the pros and cons of an 
Arctic treaty, a debate that inspired Diana Wallis, a Liberal 
MEP, to make a soft push for the idea in the EP (Arctic 
Parliamentarians, 2004:6; Wallis, 2005; Palm, 2007:16 – 18; 
Raspotnik, 2016:194 – 195; Interview with former MEP, 
2018). In 2005, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) floated the 
idea of an Arctic treaty at an expert seminar (Koivurova, 
2008:20). While these efforts were sparse and largely 
exploratory, they in some way laid the foundation for the 
politicization of the issue that was about to happen. 
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2007 – 13: NEW PUBLIC POLITICAL DISCOURSES
Around 2007, several events increased public interest 
in Arctic affairs by facilitating the creation of a new public 
political discourse. The challenges in the Arctic were not 
only environmental, social, and political, this discourse 
argued; the region could also potentially be heading toward 
a military conflict that could have global implications. This 
reframing of public political discourses allowed political 
actors to push radical Arctic treaty proposals publicly. 
However, over time their internal inconsistencies and 
active pushback from academics, the regional states, and 
Indigenous communities eventually deflated the momentum 
of these proposals. 
Of the events that pushed the debate about an Arctic 
treaty from the margins to the center stage, perhaps the 
most important was when a Russian scientific expedition 
left a small titanium flag on the ocean floor near the North 
Pole in August 2007 (Parfitt, 2007). Playing into traditional 
great game discourses of geopolitical competition, 
exploration, and conflict, the f lag-planting caught the 
attention of global media and increased interest in Arctic 
affairs manifold. For some actors, the fear was no longer 
just that the Arctic environment was under threat, but also 
that a lack of institutions and regional solutions would 
spark a regional military conflict that could spread globally. 
Suddenly most existing issues and ongoing disputes could 
be seen as signs of geopolitical competition. For example, 
the delimitation of the continental shelf was occasionally 
cast as an illegitimate land grab by the Arctic states and a 
competition for resource-rich territory that could spark a 
regional conflict. Long-standing legal disputes, such as the 
Norwegian-Russian border dispute in the Barents Sea and 
the Canadian-Danish dispute over Hans Island, exacerbated 
these concerns (Dodds, 2010, 2013; Steinberg et al., 2014; 
Rahbek-Clemmensen and Thomasen, 2018). They were 
strengthened further when a 2008 United States Geological 
Survey resource appraisal estimated that 25% of global 
undiscovered oil and gas resources were found in the Arctic 
(Bird et al., 2008). 
The framing of the Arctic as a nascent national security 
and environmental policy issue and the Arctic treaty as 
a solution was perhaps most evident in a controversial 
academic essay published in Foreign Affairs by Scott 
Borgerson (2008), a fellow with the influential Council on 
Foreign Relations. Borgerson painted a picture of a region 
facing rapid change, as sea ice was melting quickly, causing 
environmental degradation and uncovering regional 
resources and shipping lanes. The Arctic countries were 
“likely to unilaterally grab as much territory as possible and 
exert sovereign control over opening sea-lanes,” leading 
to “a new scramble for territory and resources among the 
five Arctic powers” (Borgerson, 2008:63, 73 – 74). Existing 
institutions offered no remedy for these risks, Borgerson 
argued. The Arctic Council was of little use, he claimed, 
as it did not address security issues, and UNCLOS could 
not be easily applied to address regional challenges. 
Consequently, the U.S. should enhance its involvement 
in the Arctic and push for institutional reform, including 
proposing “an imaginative new multilateral treaty” 
(Borgerson, 2008:77).
Political actors also began to make public statements 
to push Arctic treaty proposals with radical elements. 
Though they did not necessarily subscribe to Borgerson’s 
entire argument, many of them used his perception of 
an imminent national security threat and environmental 
security crisis to further their agenda. The WWF, to name 
one example, quickly issued a public statement in which 
Neil Hamilton, the director of its International Arctic 
Program, argued that the combination of environmental 
and military threats necessitated a radical Arctic treaty 
that would break with UNCLOS and create a new body to 
replace the Arctic Council: 
The political and symbolic gestures of recent 
expeditions asserting territorial claims and rights to 
unrestricted exploitation lead to nowhere and could 
revive conflicts that have affected the region in the past.
With the melting of Arctic sea ice, which allows the 
opening of new shipping routes and makes possible the 
exploration of potentially vast reserves of minerals, oil 
and gas, WWF believes that the international Law of the 
Sea Convention (UNCLOS) — the UN body regulating 
these activities — is no longer adequate for the Arctic. 
We need a new approach, which includes thinking 
about a solid Arctic Treaty and a multilateral 
governance body…. This is the only way to ensure the 
implementation of sustainable development regimes and 
help the Arctic adapt to the severe impact of climate 
change and ultimately stabilize the world’s climate.
(World Wildlife Fund, 2007) 
Similarly, MEPs spearheaded a push for an Arctic 
treaty in the EP. In October 2008, the parliament passed a 
resolution on Arctic governance with broad support from 
both sides of the aisle. Herein the Arctic was portrayed as 
a legal and institutional vacuum that was “currently not 
governed by any specifically formulated multilateral norms 
and regulations,” and which faced both environmental and 
military threats. The resolution outlined several concrete 
policy recommendations, including the development of an 
Arctic treaty: 
[T]he Commission should be prepared to pursue the 
opening of international negotiations designed to lead to 
the adoption of an international treaty for the protection 
of the Arctic, having as its inspiration the Antarctic 
Treaty, as supplemented by the Madrid Protocol signed 
in 1991, but respecting the fundamental difference 
represented by the populated nature of the Arctic and 
the consequent rights and needs of the peoples and 
nations of the Arctic region; believes, however, that as 
a minimum starting-point such a treaty could at least 
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cover the unpopulated and unclaimed area at the centre 
of the Arctic Ocean.
(EP, 2008)
The envisioned Arctic treaty was relatively moderate: 
the resolution acknowledged the principle of sustainable 
development and the importance of the Arctic Council, 
and it stressed that “any international decisions relating to 
[Arctic issues] must fully involve and take account of all 
peoples and nations of the Arctic.” Less than six months 
later, however, the EP debated a more radical resolution 
that did not acknowledge the difference between the Arctic 
and Antarctica, but instead proposed “the adoption of an 
international treaty for the protection of the Arctic, along 
the lines of the existing Antarctic Treaty, in order to make 
the Arctic a zone of peace and cooperation reserved only for 
peaceful activities and free of disputes over sovereignty.” 
While the resolution accepted the energy industry in the 
Arctic, it also proposed a 50-year moratorium on mineral 
exploitation in the Arctic (EP, 2009a). 
Like prior radical Arctic treaty ideas, these proposals 
did not provide thorough analyses of how to address 
functional gaps. Instead, they were very short and focused 
on justifying why something had to be done based on 
incomplete analyses of the challenges facing the region, 
while refraining from explaining why this something had 
to be a treaty and how it could be achieved. Borgerson’s 
(2008) essay, to take one example, cherry-picked sources 
that supported its argument, ignoring data and issues 
that could contradict it. When describing the impact of 
climate change, Borgerson (2008:66 – 67) highlighted 
models that “anticipated an ice-free Arctic in the summer 
as early as 2013,” disregarding more cautious estimates 
by authoritative sources, such as the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, which projected that this would 
happen in the second half of the 21st century (in 2017 
summer sea ice still covered 4.6 million km2) (Solomon 
et al., 2007; NSIDC, 2017). Similarly, his analyses of the 
shipping and energy prospects ignored the substantial 
obstacles facing those industries in the Arctic, such as 
the presence of sea ice in the Arctic passages, the lack of 
infrastructure and ports along the routes, the volatility of 
global energy prices, and the high break-even costs of off-
shore energy in the Arctic (Blunden, 2012). Furthermore, 
as the subsequent development demonstrates, Borgerson’s 
claims that the regional states were competing for territory 
and that the existing institutions were insufficient to handle 
these challenges were also exaggerated. More generally 
speaking, even if one assumes that the threats described 
were real, the radical proposals were reluctant to explain the 
content of the envisioned treaty. Just like Dubner (2005), 
they typically did not clarify why a treaty would provide a 
better solution than the status quo. 
The era of the broad public push for an Arctic treaty 
was short-lived, and many of its proponents moderated 
or abandoned their proposals in the following years. In a 
2013 Foreign Affairs article, Borgerson (2013:80) walked 
back from his previous alarmism, instead highlighting 
that regional cooperation had not “required a single new 
overarching legal framework.” Similarly, the WWF stopped 
actively pushing an Arctic treaty and instead focused 
its efforts on other goals (Interview with official from 
environmental NGO, 2018). The tide also began to turn 
against the Arctic treaty in the EP. The aforementioned 
radical 2009 proposal faced strong opposition from the 
commission, and several MEPs spoke out against it. 
The vote was postponed and the resolution eventually 
abandoned (EP, 2009b, c). In 2011, the EP adopted a 
resolution on the Arctic, based on a report about the EU’s 
role in the Arctic, authored by MEP Michael Gahler (2010), 
which all but extinguished the idea of an Arctic treaty. 
Instead, the EU should take on a more restrained role as a 
regional stakeholder that did not try to push its own vision 
for Arctic governance (Gahler, 2010; EP, 2011; Raspotnik, 
2016:191 – 226). Since then, radical Arctic treaty proposals 
have not been pushed forcefully in the EP. 
A combination of opposition by regional stakeholders, 
reforms that diminished functional gaps, and political 
framing explains the rapid descent of the Arctic treaty’s 
political momentum. First, several actors began to actively 
highlight the weaknesses of the unsophisticated proposals. 
One example of this could be Borgerson’s (2008) essay, 
which was highly controversial and met fierce criticism 
from the academic community (see Lathrop, 2008; Young, 
2009). Another example is the aforementioned Gahler 
report from 2010, which specifically pushed against the 
idea of an Arctic treaty. Gahler (2010:12) argued “that the 
Arctic is not regarded as a legal vacuum, but as an area 
with well developed tools for governance,” meaning that 
the proponents of an Arctic treaty would have to explain 
exactly how a treaty would improve regional governance. 
An Arctic treaty would also be normatively problematic, as 
it would disregard the wishes of the local and Indigenous 
peoples, who in many cases wanted to pursue economic 
development through resource exploitation. Finally, Gahler 
also argued that the EU lacked the regional clout and status 
necessary to push initiatives through, and he highlighted 
that all the Arctic states opposed an Arctic treaty (Gahler, 
2010; EP, 2011).
Proponents of more moderate views of an Arctic treaty 
also helped deflate the more radical proposals. An example 
of this could be the WWF, which solicited two expert 
reports that advocated for a more moderate approach 
(Huebert and Yeager, 2008; Koivurova and Molenaar, 2010). 
Unlike their more radical counterparts, these moderate 
proposals disregarded the potential military threats facing 
the Arctic and mainly emphasized environmental, social, 
and political challenges. Current regional institutions, 
they argued, could not address these issues adequately 
in their present form. For example, the Arctic Council, 
which could not impose legally binding obligations on its 
members, was unable to evaluate the implementation of 
common decisions, and lacked a permanent secretariat 
and funding. While UNCLOS could function as an 
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overarching framework for regional governance, more 
specific regulation was needed to address issues such as 
fisheries and shipping. The reports recommended reform 
of existing institutions and the creation of new institutions, 
yet the optimal solution would be, in the words of one of 
the reports, “a new international framework agreement 
covering the entire Arctic” (Koivurova and Molenaar, 
2010:6). These treaty proposals had all the hallmarks 
of a moderate view: they would be built upon existing 
institutions, including UNCLOS and the Arctic Council 
(which would be reformed and given permanent funding 
and an independent secretariat), recognize the principle 
of sustainable development and the right of Arctic states 
and local and Indigenous communities to make decisions 
regarding the future of the region, and leave military issues 
unregulated. By specifically contradicting the assertions 
of the more radical proposals, these moderate authors 
carved out a middle position between radical reform and 
acceptance of the current order, demonstrating that it was 
possible to favor an Arctic treaty without believing that the 
region was facing imminent geopolitical catastrophe. With 
the publication of these reports, the WWF moved to a more 
moderate position. 
Second, multilateral initiatives by the Arctic states 
did much to diminish the prospects of an Arctic treaty 
by showing that they could in fact cooperate on handling 
most regional challenges within the existing institutional 
setup and that fundamental reform would meet fierce 
opposition. The Arctic Council underwent significant 
reforms that enabled it to facilitate concrete policy results. 
At the 2011 Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Nuuk, 
the Council got a permanent secretariat, and the first 
of three legally binding agreements between the Arctic 
states was negotiated within the auspices of the Council 
(Kankaanpää and Young, 2012; Nord, 2015; Wilson, 2016). 
These initiatives thus countered the points of criticism that 
had previously been raised by Arctic treaty proponents. 
Furthermore, from 2009 the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO, 2015) began developing a legally 
binding Polar Code for maritime vessels operating in the 
Arctic to replace existing non-binding guidelines. The 
Polar Code was finalized and adopted in 2015, and it went 
into effect for new ships in 2017 and for existing ships in 
2018 (Jensen, 2016). In 2008 the five coastal states agreed 
to the Ilulissat Declaration that specified that existing 
international law would suffice as a framework for handling 
new challenges arising in the Arctic Ocean and that they 
would adhere to existing international law when delineating 
the outer limits of the continental shelf. Furthermore, they 
cast themselves as stewards of the Arctic Ocean, promising 
to address the challenges facing it and de facto creating a 
new regional forum (the Arctic 5) in which to discuss these 
issues. This new regional forum was highly controversial, 
as many saw the Arctic 5 as a potential competitor that 
could undermine the Arctic Council and strengthen 
the coastal states at the expense of other state and non-
state actors (Nord, 2010; Pedersen, 2012; Dodds, 2013; 
Kuersten, 2016; Jacobsen and Strandsbjerg, 2017; Rahbek-
Clemmensen and Thomasen, 2018). 
The governance initiatives would have different effects 
on the idea of an Arctic treaty. The former two initiatives 
(Arctic Council reform and the Polar Code) simply 
improved existing institutions, thus countering the claim 
that the Arctic was characterized by functional gaps that 
an Arctic treaty was needed to close. By contrast, the 
Ilulissat initiative could have both positive and negative 
effects on the idea of an Arctic treaty. The coastal states 
simultaneously signaled that they would handle governance 
problems related to the Arctic Ocean under existing 
international law (making an Arctic treaty superfluous) 
and that they would create a common front to oppose 
fundamental reform of regional institutional structures 
(making an Arctic treaty more difficult to achieve). Both of 
these aspects thus worked to deflate the momentum behind 
the Arctic treaty. However, the fact that the Arctic 5 could 
exclude Indigenous peoples’ organizations, NGOs, the 
other Arctic states, and non-Arctic states and entities from 
decision-making about Arctic Ocean issues and undermine 
the Arctic Council meant that it could cause regional 
tensions. This exclusion could justify a fundamental reform 
of Arctic institutions and thus motivate proponents to push 
even harder for an Arctic treaty (Rahbek-Clemmensen and 
Thomasen, 2018). 
Third, these multilateral efforts were supplemented with 
several bilateral initiatives. In 2010, Norway and Russia 
reached an agreement to settle their ongoing dispute in the 
Barents Sea. The agreement demonstrated that the Arctic 
states were capable of settling complex border disputes, 
thus calming fears that the ongoing delimitation process 
could lead to regional conflict (Henriksen and Ulfstein, 
2011). Furthermore, bilateral diplomacy by the Arctic states 
helped convince the European Commission and the Council 
that they should oppose the EP’s Arctic treaty resolutions. 
The EU institutions lacked a fine-tuned understanding of 
Arctic issues, and the Arctic states thus helped facilitate 
a learning process through which the Commission and 
Council came around to their position. Following the EP’s 
first Arctic resolution in 2008, senior Norwegian diplomats 
participated in extensive bilateral consultations with their 
EU counterparts to the extent that one senior commission 
official exclaimed that he felt “surrounded by Norwegians” 
(Wegge, 2012:7; see also Offerdal, 2011; Rahbek-
Clemmensen and Thomasen, 2018). 
Finally, the Indigenous peoples’ organizations made 
it obvious that governance structures could not be 
imposed or changed without respecting the rights of local 
communities. In 2009, the ICC released a declaration on 
Arctic sovereignty that defined the Inuit as a people with 
rights, including “the right to self-determination… to freely 
determine our political status, freely pursue our economic, 
social, cultural and linguistic development, and freely 
dispose of our natural wealth and resources.” Consequently, 
“Inuit inclusion as active partners is central to all national 
and international deliberations on Arctic sovereignty and 
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related questions” (ICC, 2009). Though the declaration 
was primarily a reaction to the Ilulissat Declaration, which 
the ICC believed ignored their right to inclusion and self-
determination, the message also applied to the proponents 
of an Arctic treaty: regional governance structures could 
not be imposed without including Indigenous peoples (ICC, 
2009; Shadian, 2014). 
2013 – 17: THE ARCTIC TREATY TODAY
After its brief time in the spotlight, the Arctic treaty 
once again became a marginal idea around 2013. The 
strengthening of regional governance that has happened 
over the past decade has diminished many actors’ interest 
in a treaty, but the Arctic order still contains functional gaps 
and the region is at times cast as facing both environmental 
and military threats. Consequently, the idea of an Arctic 
treaty still lives on, albeit at a much lower level. 
The regional order still contains significant functional 
gaps, thus allowing the Arctic treaty to be one model in 
a wider governance debate. Some critics argue that the 
Arctic Council still lacks the tools and will to provide 
optimal solutions to regional challenges. Although the 
Arctic Council has been strengthened over the past decade, 
it is still not a treaty-based organization, which means 
that some of the gaps that Pharand (1992) highlighted 
in the early 1990s still mar the Council today. Instead of 
making legally binding decisions within the Council, the 
states have conducted negotiations within the Council 
and then made the actual legally binding agreements 
outside of the Council. Although this has proven to be a 
pragmatic solution, it can be argued that an organization 
with a legal foundation would provide a better framework 
for legally binding agreements (Koivurova and Molenaar, 
2010). Furthermore, some critics argue that the Council is 
too beholden to the agendas of the regional states, which 
prevents it from creating truly effective solutions to the 
environmental problems facing the region (Interviews with 
officials from environmental NGOs, 2017, 2018). 
Finally, certain specific issues require the development 
of new legal mechanisms. For example, the central Arctic 
Ocean is not covered by coastal state jurisdiction, which 
means that fisheries in these waters will be unregulated in 
lieu of new international legal mechanisms. An agreement 
between the five coastal states and five stakeholders (China, 
the EU, Iceland, Japan, and South Korea) banned fisheries 
by vessels from these nations for 16 years or until a new 
legal arrangement, such as a regional fisheries management 
organization or a regional seas agreement, is created 
(Molenaar, 2015; Kramer, 2017). Similarly, as Young 
(2016a) has argued, there is currently a need for a body for 
discussing overarching issues related to the Arctic Ocean 
and for ensuring that different agreements and institutions 
coordinate with one another to avoid overlapping mandates 
and uncovered issue areas. In their current form neither the 
Arctic Council nor the group of coastal states is an optimal 
forum for handling these tasks. Although an Arctic treaty 
is not necessarily the optimal way to close these gaps, it 
remains one model that can be raised in the governance 
debate. In its 2013 Arctic strategy, Finland stated that it 
supported a moderate Arctic treaty to make “the Arctic 
Council … a treaty-based international organisation” 
(Government of Finland, 2013:14).
Public political discourses simultaneously enable 
political actors to portray the Arctic as facing both 
environmental and military threats. A 2015 article by 
former four-star admiral James Stavridis, one of the most 
respected voices within the American military community 
and former supreme allied commander of NATO’s forces 
in Europe (SACEUR), exemplifies this. In this article, 
Stavridis (2015) highlighted that: 
in the Arctic, we see increasing tension between NATO 
and Russia; military activity at a robust level (although, 
thankfully, not yet at Cold War levels); competition over 
territorial claims; large-scale exploitation of natural 
resources; disagreements about shipping lanes; and a 
host of other troubles. 
The solution to these challenges would be a somewhat 
radical Arctic treaty. Stavridis did not provide many details, 
but only suggested that a treaty should be based on the 
lessons from the Antarctic Treaty System (but acknowledge 
the differences between the regions), be based on existing 
institutions, including the Arctic Council and UNCLOS, 
and limit (but not ban) military activity. Even then, he 
cautioned, it would be a difficult endeavor, “probably close 
to the challenge of the UNCLOS process, which lasted over 
nine years” (Stavridis, 2015). Similarly, in 2017, an editorial 
in Scientific American warned that climate change and 
human activity were destroying the Arctic environment 
with 
nations with Arctic coasts scrabbling, like aggressive 
crabs, to establish territorial rights. Ice loss caused by 
climate change is opening up the Arctic, and it looks 
like the competition to take advantage has the potential 
to destroy the region and affect the entire planet.
 (Scientific American Editors, 2017)
Consequently, “the world needs a treaty that governs how 
we use this valuable region” (Scientific American Editors, 
2017). Like Stavridis, the editorial did not provide many 
details about the content of the treaty, but simply outlined 
that it should be built on top of existing institutions, 
including the Arctic Council and UNCLOS, and it should 
create quotas for certain resources. Neither of the proposals 
explained how an Arctic treaty would be able to address 
any of these challenges, or how it would improve the 
effectiveness of regional governance compared to the 
existing order. 
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CONCLUSION
The idea of an Arctic treaty has evolved as a response 
to functional gaps in Arctic governance. Maxwell Cohen 
originally devised the idea in the early 1970s as an attempt 
to push reform of the law of the sea. His Arctic Basin treaty 
would be part of a wider regional institution-building effort 
that would highlight the inconsistencies and weaknesses 
of the existing law of the sea. UNCLOS III (completed in 
1982) addressed many of the issues raised by Cohen (1971). 
The idea of an Arctic treaty was picked up again in the late 
1980s, when policymakers began debating whether the 
Arctic needed overarching institutions (which eventually 
resulted in the Arctic Council in 1996). Without a treaty 
to give it a legal foundation, it was argued, the Arctic 
Council would not be capable of addressing regional 
challenges forcefully. Indeed, the Council did not produce 
binding decisions in the first 15 years of its existence, and 
academics and eventually a few political actors began to 
argue that an Arctic treaty was needed to strengthen the 
Council and address the challenges facing the region. Some 
of these proposals were radical, pushing for a complete 
transformation of the regional order that would turn the 
region into a nature reserve. More moderate voices argued 
for reform of existing regional institutions, providing more 
detailed descriptions of the gaps in the order and how a 
moderate Arctic treaty could close these gaps. Today, the 
idea of an Arctic treaty continues to exist as a possible 
response to functional gaps in the regional order, albeit at 
the margins of the governance debate.
Public political discourses have also been influential. 
This influence is particularly visible from 2007, when 
Arctic issues attracted public attention, and public 
political discourses portrayed the region as facing both 
environmental and military threats with potential global 
impact. This combination of increased public attention and 
new political discourses paved the way for radical Arctic 
treaty proposals that were pushed by both academics and 
political actors. Pushback from the regional states and more 
moderate voices in the form of public reports and statements 
as well as tangible reforms of regional institutions and other 
government initiatives eventually deflated this momentum.
The history of the idea of an Arctic treaty offers 
important lessons about the Arctic order. First, it illustrates 
that the idea of an Arctic treaty is not likely to disappear 
anytime soon. As long as the regional order contains 
functional gaps and is cast as threatened by imminent 
environmental and military challenges, an Arctic treaty 
is likely to be seen as a viable solution by at least some 
political actors. Although it currently exists at the margins 
of the regional governance debate, it is not impossible to 
imagine that an unexpected event akin to the Russian flag-
planting in 2007, such as a major oil spill, the sinking of 
a commercial ship, or a military confrontation caused by a 
misunderstanding, can push it back into the limelight. 
Second, regional governance reforms and public 
diplomacy help states maintain their privileged position 
in the regional order. The real challenge facing state 
policymakers is not the idea of an Arctic treaty as such, but 
rather radical versions of this idea that could fundamentally 
transform the regional order, causing the Arctic states to 
lose their privileged position in regional institutions. The 
radical approach becomes most viable when public political 
discourses portray the region as threatened environmentally 
and militarily. States can prevent the development of such 
discourses by ensuring that major functional gaps are 
addressed, either through capable regional institutions 
or through unilateral policies, and through an active 
diplomatic effort. 
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